Abstract: Why do governments sometimes accommodate self-determination movements even when reputation-building theories predict resistance? This paper develops a two-period model in which a government faces sequential separatist challengers and may be eliminated after losing an early conflict. The model shows that elimination danger changes the logic of reputation building. When the risk of elimination is low, governments may fight early challengers to deter future ones. When the risk is high, however, fighting today can prevent the government from surviving to benefit from any reputation for toughness, making accommodation more attractive. The paper then evaluates this implication using movement-year data from the Self-Determination Movement dataset. It introduces a new country-year index of incumbent elimination vulnerability based on recent coup exposure, irregular leader exit, and leader tenure. The empirical analysis shows that governments facing higher elimination vulnerability are more likely to accommodate self-determination movements, especially in country-years with more other active movements. Walter-style future-stakes results also appear in some specifications, particularly for the strategic value of other groups' claims, but they are less consistent than the elimination-vulnerability mechanism. The results support a conditional revision of reputation-building theories: the political value of toughness depends not only on future challengers and future stakes, but also on whether governments expect to survive the costs of demonstrating resolve.
Author: Myrto KASIOUMI, Márton SZABÓ
Keywords: self-determination; separatism; reputation building; accommodation; elimination risk; political vulnerability; civil conflict; territorial conflict